Challenging classical self-determination : Kosovo’s case for self-determination

Abstract

Considering that no so long ago the status of self-determination as a legal principle was a contested one at best, present considerations and debate surrounding the said principle shed light not only on the sheer developments registered but are also indicative of the way and pace at which progress is registered in an area of law that is so intricately intertwined with the political. This right to self-determination, described in typical formulations as the right by which 'All peoples [may] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development', has not only come to be generally recognised (by most Western jurists at least) as a legal principle but has also been confirmed by the International Court of Justice as a right applicable erga omnes. Indeed, in its very recent Advisory Opinion, the ICJ observed that the principle of self-determination has developed in such a way that 'a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation' can be said to have been established.