The Arab Spring and the Post-Arab Spring (2011-19) : an assessment of the European response

Abstract

European Union policies, towards the Arab and Mediterranean countries, since 1957, pursued the same objectives: energy, markets, and security. Other objectives such as conflict resolution, human rights and democracy promotion have often been mentioned in the official EU documents, but the discrepancy between rhetoric and deeds has been marked. The European role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been marginal, declaratory, often hesitant and incoherent. Although all agreements between the EU and Mediterranean and Arab countries include a Human Rights clause based on the respect of democratic principles, the EU has always pursued good relations with authoritarian Arab regimes, which often paid lip service to reform and never engaged in real democratisation. The Arab Spring prompted the EU to launch new policy initiatives but there is no clear reference in published documents to the Arab World, Arab Youth or Arab Identity 鈥� and this is not a trivial omission. Instead, reference is made to 鈥淪outhern neighbourhood鈥� or 鈥淪outhern Mediterranean鈥�, but Yemen and Bahrain do not form part of these. The 2016 EU Global Strategy鈥檚 objectives are perhaps too ambitious, a 鈥渞emarkable exercise in fantasy鈥�. Despite the objectives set out in the strategy, the EU has backtracked on Syria, the Iran Nuclear Deal and kept aloof from the troubled Gulf Cooperation Council, President Trump鈥檚 decision to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem and the withdrawal of American funding of UNRWA as well as Israel鈥檚 annexation of the Golan Heights. The only hope for the future of the EU鈥檚 relations with the Arab world lies in continuing the recently revived dialogue between the Arab League and the Union. As the European Parliament has noted, 鈥渋nsufficient EU leadership and initiative in working towards the solution of protracted conflicts have weakened the EU鈥檚 capacity to make a diplomatic impact in the region.鈥�