The notion of `causa' in the law of obligations

Abstract

Our Law, in section 1007 of the Civil Code, provides that "the conditions essential for the validity of a contract are: (a) capacity of the parties to contract; (b) the consent of the party who binds himself; (c) a certain thing which constitutes the subject matter of the contract; (d) a lawful consideration. The code, as we can see, attributes equal importance to these four conditions: they are all required for the ‘validity’ of a contract. Doctrine, however, has distinguished between them. While three of the conditions mentioned in s. 1007 are considered necessary for the very existence of the contract, namely, consent, object and lawful consideration, only one condition, namely capacity, is necessary for the validity of the contract. The distinction between conditions for the ‘existence’ and conditions for the ‘validity’ of a judicial act is very important, in that while in default of the former the juridical act does not exist in the eyes of the law, and is therefore non-existent and consequently can produce no juridical effects whatsoever; on the other hand, in default of the latter, the juridical act exists notwithstanding such default. It is not null ab ignition, but it merely gives rise to an action for rescinding the act. This important distinction has been generally accepted by jurists.