Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: /library/oar/handle/123456789/69116
Title: An incentive model of corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region
Authors: Rontos, Konstantinos
Sioussiouras, Petros
Vavouras, Ioannis S.
Keywords: Corruption -- Balkan Peninsula
Governance
Political rights
Issue Date: 2012
Publisher: ISMASYSTEMS Scientific Research
Citation: Rontos, K., Sioussiouras, P., & Vavouras, I. S. (2012). An incentive model of corruption in the Mediterranean and Balkan region. International Journal of Finance, Insurance and Risk Management, 2(2), 99-110.
Abstract: The study considers the determinants of corruption in the 23 Mediterranean and Balkan countries where it is widely recognized that this phenomenon is widespread. Starting from the general hypothesis that the extent of corruption in any country is a combination of motives and opportunities, our scope is to examine the most important economic, political and social factors that determine corruption in this region. We accept that motives are determined by the level of human development, while opportunities by the degree of government effectiveness, which in turn is determined by the level of economic development and the existing political system. We show that the level of corruption is affected by the degree of human development, while the degree of government effectiveness affects crucially the level of corruption. On its turn, government effectiveness is mainly determined by the level of economic development and the existing political system. Improving government effectiveness, increasing the levels of human and economic development and establishing a more democratic political system form therefore the pillars of any anticorruption strategies in these countries.
URI: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/69116
Appears in Collections:Volume 2, Issue 2, 2012

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